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Abstract 
Recent research conducted in Western, democratic societies indicates that temporary uncertainty 
inductions lead to intolerance of religious dissent, increased conviction in religious attitudes, and 
even increased support for holy war. Past and current conflicts based on religious ideology 
underscore the danger such responses to uncertainty can pose. This paper responds to the need to 
learn how to control responses to uncertainty. After having confirmed through pilot testing that 
uncertainty increases self-report religious faith, two subsequent studies investigate different 
techniques to control compensatory responses to uncertainty. Study 1 demonstrates that 
uncertainty-induced increases in religiosity can be eliminated by a post-uncertainty directed 
positive recall writing task. Study 2 presents evidence for an uncertainty “inoculation”, whereby 
a pre-uncertainty self-affirmation exercise can protect against uncertainty compensation effects. 
These findings, in combination with a consideration of previous research, offer insight into how 
undesirable uncertainty compensation effects might be reduced and even prevented.  
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Uncertainty and Religious Reactivity: Uncertainty Compensation, Repair, and Inoculation 
In his essay “The End of History?”, Francis Fukuyama (1989) argued that with the end of 
the cold war, conflict based on ideology was dead. He postulated that the ideologies of liberal 
democracy and communism were the last great belief systems capable of causing significant 
violent conflict. History unfortunately has shown this to be wrong, and religious ideology may be 
the prime mover behind the annihilation of his hopeful hypothesis (e.g. Kinnvall, 2004).  
Conflicts from Ireland to Afghanistan are a tragic testament to the power of religious 
attitudes, and we recently have learned that uncertainty can have disturbing effects on such 
attitudes. For instance, after being exposed to uncertainty, people respond more negatively to 
attacks on their religious views (van den Bos, van Ameijde, & van Gorp, 2006), show increased 
zeal in their religious convictions and, chillingly, are more supportive of religious war 
(McGregor, Haji, Nash, & Teper, 2008).  
The present research has two major foci. First, unlike previous research, this work 
focuses on how uncertainty threat influences individual religious faith, not on the problems of 
religious intolerance (van den Bos et al., 2006), zeal, or support for religious war (McGregor et 
al., 2001). Individual religious faith may form an important schema that underpins a wide variety 
of behaviors, and has important implications for the kinds of values that people endorse (e.g. 
Roccas, 2005). Second, the present research focuses on ways that uncertainty threat can be 
controlled—by repair or inoculation. An initial study demonstrates how uncertainty threat effects 
on religious faith can be “repaired” with a post-uncertainty memory recall task. A subsequent 
study demonstrates a new means of uncertainty control—one in which participants can be 
“inoculated” against uncertainty.  
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 Learning to control the effects of uncertainty seems especially important in light of the 
substantial knowledge gained over the last decade about how people react to uncertainty. For 
instance, we know that uncertainty causes compensatory conviction, the hardening of attitudes in 
response to uncertainty (McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, & Spencer, 2001). This work demonstrates 
that exposure to uncertainty causes participants to increase the extremity and certainty of their 
social convictions (such as attitudes toward the death penalty or gun control). Participants also 
sometimes will compensate for uncertainty by pursuing personal projects that are more 
consistent with important personal values (McGregor et al., 2001). Previous research thus 
demonstrates that uncertainty paradoxically can cause increased certainty in both socially 
relevant attitudes and the self. We also have learned that uncertainty increases identification with 
minimal groups (Grieve & Hogg, 1999). When participants are uncertain prior to allocating 
resources between two arbitrarily formed groups, they allocate greater amounts of resources to 
their own group than they otherwise would. Further, uncertainty causes people to place a 
premium on issues of fairness (van den Bos, 2001). For instance, participants who are denied 
voice in determining their outcomes respond most negatively when they first have been made to 
feel uncertain. Fair process seems to reassure people that the world is an orderly, predicable 
place when they are feeling uncertain; denying fair process denies them a means to deal with 
their uncertainty (e.g. van den Bos, 2001). Existing research demonstrates that people will go to 
lengths in their attempts to deal with uncertainty.  
 Although the list of effects tied to uncertainty is growing, research has been slower to 
uncover the means by which compensatory reactions to uncertainty can be controlled. Theories 
of uncertainty provide some ideas for this, however. One common theoretical perspective on 
uncertainty is that it poses a potent self-threat. From Heider (1958) to Weary and Edwards 
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(1994) and Hogg (2007), certain types of uncertainty are portrayed theoretically as aversive, and 
as a threat to prediction and control needs. This self-threat conceptualization of uncertainty 
suggests that self-enhancing manipulations might reduce some of uncertainty’s effects, an idea 
that has received limited attention.  
McGregor et al. (2001) found that a post-uncertainty self-affirmation task (e.g. Steele & 
Liu, 1983) blocked the impact of uncertainty on compensatory conviction. In keeping with 
theoretical conceptualizations of uncertainty, uncertainty threat was reduced by the post-
uncertainty self-affirmation task. Although this research is encouraging, other research has 
questioned whether these effects are replicable. Hogg and Svensson (2006; reported in Hogg, 
2007) found that a post uncertainty self-affirmation task did not reduce uncertainty effects on 
compensatory social identification. The theoretical meaning of this null effect is not entirely 
clear, however, especially given that McGregor (2006) recently replicated the original 
(McGregor et al. 2001) finding that post uncertainty self-affirmation could reduce the 
consequences of an uncertainty induction. Under some conditions, at least, self-affirmation 
appears to reduce the impact of uncertainty. 
 Recent findings that state uncertainty increases religious intolerance and even increases 
willingness for religious war (e.g. McGregor et al., 2008) underscore the need to advance 
understanding of how to control compensatory responses to uncertainty. This paper tests two 
approaches to controlling effects of uncertainty on religious attitudes. The first approach to 
uncertainty control either presents or does not present participants with a self-repair opportunity 
before measuring religious attitudes. After exposure to uncertainty, participants are asked to 
recall either positive or negative events in personally relevant life domains. To the extent that 
uncertainty triggers needs for threat compensation, recalling positive events might offer 
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participants a chance to repair any sense of self-threat, eliminating the effects of uncertainty on 
religious attitudes. The second approach tests the idea that a self-affirmation manipulation may 
offer a prophylaxis against uncertainty. Specifically, completing a self-affirmation task before 
exposure to uncertainty may inoculate participants so that their religious attitudes remain stable 
in the face of uncertainty. Such a finding would provide valuable insight into how people can be 
helped to manage the many sources of uncertainty that are part of life. Whereas previous 
research has shown that post-uncertainty manipulations seem to repair any disturbance caused by 
the effects of uncertainty, a finding that a pre-uncertainty manipulation could protect people 
from uncertainty threat would be a significant advance.  
The Santa Clara Strength of Religious Faith Questionnaire (SCSORF; Plante & 
Boccaccini, 1997) served as the dependent measure in all studies. This scale has established 
psychometric properties (Lewis, Shevlin, McGuckin, & Navratil, 2001) and has been applied in 
contexts ranging from oncology (Sherman et al., 2001) to weight loss (Fitzgibbon et al., 2005) 
and depression (Aukst-Margetic, Jakovljevic, Margetic, Biscan, & Samija, 2005). Sample items 
include “My religious faith is extremely important to me.”, and “I consider myself active in my 
faith or church.” Responses are provided on a 7-point scale, with higher scores, averaged across 
items, indicating greater religiosity.  
 Before testing whether effects of uncertainty on religiosity could be controlled, a pilot 
study was conducted to establish whether the Santa Clara religiosity measure would be sensitive 
to an uncertainty induction in American participant samples. In this pilot study, 44 (35 female) 
participants entered the lab. They first completed an uncertainty induction or television control 
task patterned after Wichman, et al. (2008; Study 2). In the uncertainty induction task, 
participants were asked to describe the thoughts and feelings, as well as the physical state they 
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perceive during the experience of not understanding why something has happened. The control 
condition asked corresponding questions about the experience of watching television. 
Participants then completed word search tasks for 3 min, based on research showing that 
uncertainty compensation effects are most likely when uncertainty is followed by a brief 
delay/distracter task (Wichman et al., 2008). Results showed that, as expected, writing about 
uncertainty (M = 4.8, SD = 1.4) increased claimed religiosity compared to the control condition 
(M = 3.7, SD = 2.1)  (F (1, 42) = 4.17, p  = .048, η2partial = .09).  
Uncertainty salience caused higher levels of claimed religiosity. Whereas previous 
research has measured zealousness in religious beliefs, support for religious war (McGregor, 
Haji, Nash, & Teper, 2008), or anger in response to anti-religious statements, (van den Bos, van 
Ameijde, & van Gorp, 2006), this is the first finding of increased claimed personal religious 
faith. Study 1 was conducted next, as the first test of an uncertainty compensation control 
strategy in the domain of religious attitudes. Specifically, Study 1 tested whether a post-
uncertainty  memory recall writing task could repair the impact of uncertainty on religiosity.  
Method 
Participants were randomly assigned to condition in a 2 (uncertainty prime, no 
uncertainty prime) X 2 (positive vs. negative event memory recall) between participants design. 
The sample was composed of advanced undergraduate nursing students (N = 49;  43 female) 
who completed questionnaire packets in a large lecture course on  a voluntary basis. These 
students already had personal experience working with patients, and the personal relevance of 
this clinical experience was utilized in the uncertainty manipulation. In the questionnaire packet, 
participants first were asked either to briefly describe “A time when you were working with a 
patient in clinical and, either, second-guessed your actions or were unsure how to resolve a 
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patient problem.” Or “The course level and subject matter in each of the nursing courses that you 
are currently enrolled in this quarter.” These instructions served as the uncertainty or control 
primes, respectively. Next, participants completed either a positive or negative event recall task.  
In the positive event recall condition, participants briefly described “A time that you feel you had 
professionally or academically succeeded considerably.  What were some of the thoughts you 
had?  How did you feel?  Please remember as vividly as you can.”  In the negative event recall 
condition, they briefly described “A time that you feel you had professionally or academically 
failed considerably. What were some of the thoughts you had?  How did you feel?  Please 
remember as vividly as you can.” Participants then completed the Positive and Negative Affect 
Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) as a distraction task. Because the PANAS was 
intended to serve as a distraction task and was not of theoretical interest at the time, its scores 
were not recorded. The PANAS was followed by the SCSORF (Plante & Boccaccini, 1997). 
Participants subsequently were debriefed. 
Results 
The SCSORF scale was averaged so that higher scores indicated higher claimed 
religiosity. This average was analyzed with a 2 (uncertainty; yes/no) X 2 (event recall; 
success/failure) ANOVA. As seen in Figure 1, the expected interaction was obtained (F (1, 45) = 
7.7, p = .008, η2partial = .146). When participants had written about a personal failure, they 
showed increased religiosity under uncertainty (F (1, 45) = 4.84, p = .033, η2partial = .097).  
However, when participants had written about a personal success, uncertainty did not increase 
religiosity (F (1, 45) = 2.89, p = .088, η2partial = .063). In fact, uncertainty marginally decreased 
religiosity.  
Discussion 
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Uncertainty increased religiosity only for individuals who recalled negative events after 
exposure to uncertainty. When an alternative compensation opportunity was offered in the form 
of a personal success recall task, participants showed no increased religiosity effects. This 
finding is consistent with the idea that uncertainty does not result in defensive responding when 
individuals are given the opportunity to repair threatened self-worth.  
In the personal success recall condition, uncertainty marginally decreased religiosity. 
This implies that under conditions where the potential self-worth threat of uncertainty has been 
eliminated, uncertainty may work more purely as a meta-cognition, as opposed to a self-threat 
that elicits a compensation response. Uncertainty therefore may have led participants to doubt 
their religiosity, rather than to respond with increased conviction (c.f. McGregor, 2001; 
Wichman et al., in preparation). Prior work on uncertainty as threat has not considered the 
conditions under which uncertainty plays a doubt-inducing or a conviction-increasing role, but 
this finding appears to offer some insight into this question.  
Whereas previous research has investigated post-uncertainty integrity repair tasks with 
non-religious attitudes (c.f. McGregor et al., 2001), Study 1 provides the first evidence that a 
post-uncertainty self-repair manipulation can decrease compensatory effects of uncertainty on 
religiosity. In contrast to Hogg and Svensson (2006; cited in Hogg, 2007), who found no effects 
of a post uncertainty self-repair manipulation in a social-identity paradigm, these results support 
the effectiveness of this type of manipulation for religious attitudes.  
One possible, though unlikely, alternative explanation for the results of Study 1 involves 
affect. The logic of uncertainty threat suggests that in addition to responding to self-affirmation 
tasks such as that used by McGregor et al. (2001) temporary uncertainty inductions might lead to 
decreased self-esteem or depressed affect. Evidence for this idea has not been consistent. 
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McGregor et al. (2001) failed to find effects of uncertainty on either state self-esteem or state 
positive or negative affect. Other researchers also have failed to find consistent effects of 
uncertainty on measures of affect (e.g. van den Bos, Euwema, Poortvliet, & Maas, 2007; 
Wichman, Brunner, & Weary, 2008). 
Nevertheless, it remained a possibility that when the uncertainty induction immediately 
was followed by the personal failure recall task, that subsequent negative affect led participants 
to claim higher religiosity as a means of coping with uncertainty-induced negative affect. Study 
1 did not include an uncertainty-only control condition to investigate this question. Further, 
PANAS scores were not recorded in Study 1 to investigate whether uncertainty-induced negative 
affect might have caused the observed increase in religiosity1. Study 2 incorporated 
modifications to address these issues. 
Considering the state of research on uncertainty threat, uncertainty is thought to threaten 
the integrity of the self (e.g. McGregor et al., 2001). Uncertainty compensation attempts 
correspondingly often take the form of behaviors that in some way re-establish self-integrity. 
Previous research on how uncertainty compensation can be managed has provided participants 
with compensation, or integrity-repair, opportunities that occur at least in part after exposure to 
uncertainty. We now understand that if participants can repair their self-integrity after 
uncertainty before responding to the main dependent measure, the effects of uncertainty on this 
dependent measure are often reduced. We as yet do not know if it is possible to obviate entirely 
the need for self-integrity repair by pre-emptive buffering of the self. Is it possible not just to 
repair the effects of uncertainty threat, but to inoculate against it before it occurs?  
Study 2 
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Some recent research suggests that uncertainty inoculation theoretically is possible. Two 
recent experiments (McGregor & Marigold, 2003, and McGregor, Nail, Marigold, & Kang, 
2005) indicate that uncertainty threat can interact with unstable self-esteem to cause 
compensatory conviction. If self-esteem instability makes people defensive in response to 
uncertainty, a manipulation to increase self-integrity might work to inoculate, or at least 
temporarily buffer, against uncertainty threat. Study 2 tests this idea by giving participants a self-
affirmation opportunity or not before exposure to the uncertainty induction. As noted above, 
Study 2 also addresses a possible concern with the design of Study 1: the lack of a neutral event 
recall condition. Although the pilot study provided the initial demonstration of the reliability of 
uncertainty effects on the SCSORF, it remained possible that uncertainty was most likely to 
cause increased religiosity when combined with negative event recall. Study 2 used a neutral 
control condition in conjunction with uncertainty to address this concern. Study 2 further 
included the PANAS as a distraction task but this time responses were recorded so that affect 
could be examined as a potential alternative explanation for any effects.  
Method and Results 
Participants (N = 81; 51 females) were approached across campus and asked to complete 
a short survey as part of a psychology class project. They first completed the self-affirmation 
task, followed by the uncertainty induction, the PANAS distracter/delay task, and the SCSORF 
scale before being debriefed. 
 The self-affirmation task was based on that used by Cohen, Aronson, and Steele (2000). 
Participants picked from a list of 5 values either their most important value and wrote about why 
it was important to them, or picked their least important value, but wrote about how it could be 
important for someone else. The values options included: Business/ Economics/ Making Money, 
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Art/ Music/ Theatre, Science/ Pursuit of Knowledge, Social Life/ Relationships, and Social 
Action/ Helping Others.  
 The uncertainty prime was identical to one used by Wichman, Brunner, and Weary 
(2008; Study 2). Participants were asked to write either about their thoughts and feelings when 
uncertain about something that had happened, or about their thoughts and feelings while 
watching television in the control condition.  
To test affect as a possible alternative explanation for any uncertainty-religiosity effects, 
PANAS items were averaged into their positive (α = .80) and negative (α = .84) subscales. 
Separate 2(uncertainty; yes/no) X 2 (self-affirmation; yes/no) ANOVAs on these positive and 
negative subscales showed only a main effect of self-affirmation on the positive PANAS items; 
(F (1, 77) = 4.01, p = .049, η2partial = .05). There were no other effects on either the positive (ps > 
.24) or negative (ps > .73) PANAS. These results indicate that uncertainty-induced changes in 
affect are not responsible for uncertainty-religiosity effects. 
For the main analysis, the religiosity scale was averaged as in the previous two studies. 
An ANOVA revealed a significant interaction of Self-Affirmation with Uncertainty conditions 
(F (1, 77) = 4.33, p = .041, η2partial = .053). The nature of this interaction is shown in Figure 2. In 
the no affirmation condition, the uncertainty prime condition had significantly higher religiosity 
scores than the control condition (F (1, 77) = 4.34, p = .041, η2partial = .053). In the affirmation 
condition, however, there was no significant difference between uncertainty and no uncertainty 
conditions (F (1, 77) = 0.70, p = .40, η2partial = .009). This result is consistent with uncertainty 
inoculation.  
To further investigate the possible role of affect in bringing about these results, religiosity 
scores were regressed onto dummy coded uncertainty, self-affirmation, their interaction, and 
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standardized positive and negative affect. This analysis showed a simple main effect of positive 
affect on religiosity (t (1, 75) = 2.8; B = .60; p = .006, η2partial = .095). Greater positive affect was 
associated with higher claimed religiosity. This finding of higher positive affect predicting 
higher religiosity suggests that the religiosity findings in Study 1 were not due to uncertainty-
induced negative affect. Further, this analysis showed that the interaction of self-affirmation and 
uncertainty remained significant (t (1, 75) = 2.2; B = 1.70; p = .034, η2partial = .059) when positive 
and negative affect were controlled. The fact that the self-affirmation X uncertainty effect 
remained essentially unchanged while controlling positive and negative affect, and the positive 
affect finding, which speaks against a negative affect compensation explanation for the 
religiosity effect, suggests that the uncertainty-religiosity effect may be cognitively mediated.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
In contrast to previous findings showing the malleability of religious attitudes (e.g. 
McGregor et al., 2008; van den Bos et al., 2006), the results of these studies suggest that 
religious attitudes may be able to withstand the influence of uncertainty. Whereas Study 1 found 
uncertainty compensation only in the negative event recall + uncertainty condition, the pilot 
study, and now Study 2 have demonstrated that uncertainty alone resulted in compensation 
attempts as measured by increases in self-report religiosity.  
Previous work has examined the role of dispositional self-esteem as a pre-existing 
influence on responses to uncertainty (McGregor et al., 2001), but has not investigated how 
changes in the situation, before exposure to uncertainty, can prevent uncertainty compensation 
effects all-together. This finding marks the first observation of a solely pre-uncertainty 
manipulation that can eliminate uncertainty compensation effects, and experimentally rules out 
the possibility that post uncertainty distraction might be responsible for the apparent role of self-
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affirmation manipulations in eliminating these effects. Inoculation against uncertainty threat is 
possible.  
The finding in Study 2 showing that positive affect was associated with greater religiosity 
suggests that self-affirmation exercises as used to control uncertainty do not need to exert their 
influence via affect. The observed influence of positive affect is the opposite of what one would 
expect if uncertainty-induced negative affect, or self-affirmation induced positive affect, were 
responsible for these findings. Given the missing PANAS scores in Study 1, one cannot be 
certain if affect played the same role in Study 1 as in Study 2, but it seems reasonable to 
conclude that self-integrity repair tasks need not operate through affective mechanisms.  
  These data therefore appear to rule out affect as a cause of uncertainty effects on 
religiosity. Implicit positive affect still might be a possibility (e.g. Koole, Smeets, van 
Knippenberg, & Dijksterjuis, 1999), although previous research suggests that uncertainty primes 
are unrelated to implicit affect (Wichman, Brunner, & Weary, 2008). Given the lack of support 
for affect as a causal factor and the efficacy of the self-esteem related manipulations in the 
current experiments, it appears that self-esteem, either as a manipulated variable or as a 
consequence of successful goal pursuit, might be a fruitful focus of investigation (although see 
Tesser, 2001 for an argument on the substitutability of self-protective processes).  
One desirable goal is to discover what makes uncertainty so potent in influencing 
judgment and behavior. Fortunately, existing theoretical perspectives on uncertainty offer a 
conceptual starting point. This starting point appears to be the degree to which different types of 
uncertainty threaten central goals. Indeed, different areas of research have demonstrated the 
effects of uncertainty for a variety of important goals. For instance, goals for prediction and 
control are served by attribution processes (Heider, 1958), and the effects of uncertainty in 
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relationship to these goals are the focus of work on Causal Uncertainty (CU; Weary & Edwards, 
1994). In addition to prediction and control, other important goals threatened by uncertainty 
include group identification (the focus of Uncertainty Identity Theory; Hogg, 2007). Identity 
consolidation theory (McGregor, 2004) is perhaps the most inclusive perspective; it focuses on 
personally important uncertainty, accepting that such uncertainty can stem from many sources. 
These perspectives suggest that a focus on the link between uncertainty and goal pursuit may be 
fruitful. 
In general, research suggests that unless uncertainty is aversive and relevant, it probably 
will not cause compensatory responding (see, e.g. van den Bos, 2004). This previous emphasis 
on uncertainty as a threat has yielded many insights, but a full understanding of uncertainty 
should take into consideration not only uncertainty-threat, but also the meaning of uncertainty in 
different contexts. When does uncertainty lead to doubt, when to compensatory conviction? 
Among others, one factor influencing the role of uncertainty might be mindfulness. A 
variety of mindfulness related approaches have been used to help manage psychological 
disturbance (e.g. Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999, Linehan, 1993), and these might offer ways 
to deal with uncertainty threat. Increased mindfulness should decrease uncertainty reactivity, and 
related constructs, such as self-compassion (Neff, 2003) may also provide insights into how 
uncertainty can be effectively managed. 
The current work indicates that temporary self-affirmation related manipulations can 
protect against uncertainty effects on religious attitudes. It is ironic that some effects of 
uncertainty on religious faith can be reduced by bolstering the same self-system that religion 
ideally transcends.  
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Footnotes 
1Paper questionnaires were destroyed in error before PANAS scores could be recorded.
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Interaction of Uncertainty Induction and Directed Recall Task predicting Religiosity. 
Figure 2. Interaction of Uncertainty Induction and Self-Affirmation Task predicting Religiosity. 
